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FOR WHOM THE STATUTE TOLLS - THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO FOREIGN
DEFENDANTS IN COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT
PERMIT SERVICE BY MAIL
I. INTRODUCTION
A statute of limitations bars a law suit unless the suit is filed
within a prescribed time.' The fundamental notion underlying a
statute of limitations is that individuals must be afforded a fair op-
portunity to prepare a defense.' As the United States Supreme Court
noted, statutes of limitations "are designed to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been al-
lowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared." 8 In time, the right to be free of
stale claims prevails over the right to prosecute them.
The policy considerations underlying statutes of limitations are
only served if the plaintiff has the ability to prosecute his or her
claim. If some disability precludes the injured party from pursuing
an action, allowance should be made for the period of that disabil-
ity.' To provide that allowance, states have enacted tolling provi-
sions' which suspend or "toll" the statute of limitations during the
period of incapacity.' For example, to protect a plaintiff while a de-
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1. A statute of limitations is a statute of repose, designed to compel suit within a
reasonable time in the interest of society, serving to prevent perjuries, frauds,
and mistakes, and its purpose is to force a litigant to pursue every avenue of
relief promptly, while evidence is fresh and witnesses available.
Dedmon v. Falls Prods. Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally Comment,
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
2. Comment, The Tolling Provision of the Statute of Limitations-A Haven for the
Dilatory Plaintiff, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 585, 587 (1980).
3. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
4. See Comment, supra note 2, at 587.
5. BLACK's LAW DIcMrsONARY 1334 (5th ed. 1979) defines "Toll" as "[tlo suspend or
stop temporarily as the statute of limitations is tolled during the defendant's absence from the
jurisdiction and during the plaintiff's minority." Id.
6. One of the earliest tolling provisions was 21 James 1, c. 16 (1623). In this provision
the limitation period was suspended while the person entitled to the action was under twenty-
one years of age, femme covert (a single woman), non compos mentis (mentally incapacitated),
imprisoned or beyond the seas. See Comment, supra note 2, at 587 n.10.
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fendant is out of the jurisdiction, tolling provisions suspend the run-
ning of the statute of limitations until the defendant returns to the
state." In California, section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vides for the tolling of the statute of limitations while the defendant
is out of the state. Section 351 provides:
If when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of
the state, the action may be commenced within the term herein
limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause of
action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of his absence
is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action. 8
Although the statute's language is clear, California courts have ap-
plied the tolling provision differently with respect to individuals and
corporations. If the defendant is an individual, the statute of limita-
tions is tolled during the period he or she is out of the state.' How-
ever, if the defendant is a corporation, the statute of limitations is not
tolled because corporations may be effectively served either directly
through the mail or indirectly through the Secretary of State. A
problem arises, however, because certain foreign corporations are not
susceptible to service through these means. These corporations are
located in countries which have objected to service by mail through
an international treaty, the Hague Convention on Service Abroad.
Because these special foreign corporations may not be effectively
served through the mail or the Secretary of State,10 they should be
treated like individual defendants and the section 351 tolling provi-
sions should apply. The effect of tolling the statute for these special
foreign corporations is to subject them to suit indefinitely.
This comment addresses the problems posed by these special
foreign corporations in the context of California law. First, it exam-
ines the distinctions made between individual and corporate defend-
ants in the application of the section 351 tolling provision. Second,
this comment suggests that, since foreign corporate defendants lo-
cated in countries which do not permit service by mail cannot effec-
7. These saving clauses, as they are often referred to, developed in England to provide a
tolling of the statute of limitations while defendant was beyond the seas. See Limitation of
Actions-Absence from State as a Basis of Tolling Statute of Limitations Despite Availability
of Service Under Nonresident Motorist Statute, 12 VAND. L. REV. 295, 296 (1958) and H.
BUSHWELL, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION § 116 (1889).
8. CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 351 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
9. "Out of the state" includes residence and travel outside California. Thus, if an indi-
vidual travelled to Nevada for a weekend, this would constitute "out of the state" for tolling
purposes.
10. CAL. CoaP. CODE § 2111(a) (West 1977). See infra note 23 for relevant text.
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tively be served through the Secretary of State, this special class of
defendants should be treated like individuals for purposes of apply-
ing the section 351 tolling provision. This has the unfortunate conse-
quence of subjecting these defendants to suit indefinitely because
they are permanently out of the state.
This can be extremely important with respect to many cases.
For example, in products liability cases where the statute of limita-
tions has run against local dealers and distributors, California plain-
tiffs continue to have a cause of action against foreign manufactur-
ers. To remedy this inconsistency, this comment proposes that the
California tolling statute, Civil Procedure Code section 351, be
amended with respect to corporations located in countries which do
not permit service by mail. The amendment should provide for toll-
ing the statute unless the corporation voluntarily appoints an agent
to accept service within California. This proposed legislation would
benefit both the California plaintiff and the foreign corporate de-
fendant. The California plaintiff would not be faced with the diffi-
culties that may arise when serving a foreign defendant. The foreign
defendant would not be subject to indefinite liability because a stat-
ute of limitations would apply upon voluntary compliance with the
statute.
II. BACKGROUND
California Code of Civil Procedure section 35111 provides for
the tolling of the statute of limitations while the defendant is out of
the state. Section 351 applies differently to individuals and corpora-
tions because the latter are also subject to alternative methods of ser-
vice pursuant to provisions of the California Corporations Code. 2
A. Amenability to Service is the Distinguishing Factor Between
Individuals and Corporations
1. Applicability to Individual Defendants
The seminal case interpreting section 351 as it applies to an
individual defendant is Dew v. Appleberry1 In Dew, the defendant
was absent from California on vacation for five weeks during the
year following the accident in question. The California Supreme
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 351 (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 8.
12. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1987). See infra note
23 for relevant text.
13. 23 Cal. 3d 630, 591 P.2d 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1979).
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Court held that the statute of limitations tolled during the period of
defendant's absence.14 Thus, an action filed one year and one day
after the alleged accident was not barred by the one year statute of
limitations. The defendant argued that the tolling provision should
not apply when the absent party is nonetheless amenable to service
of process. 1' He noted that the original statute had been enacted in
1872 because at that time defendants could not be served by sum-
mons. The defendant pointed out that the Legislature subsequently
provided for alternative methods of service." Thus, defendant
claimed a plaintiff did not need the protection of the tolling provision
when the absent party was still amenable to process. The California
Supreme Court held, however, that "[slection 351 does not make its
tolling provision depend on the availability of service on a defendant,
but on his physical presence in California." 7 Noting that the Legis-
lature was clearly aware of the statute's broad ramifications and had
modified the rule in appropriate circumstances, 1" the court held that
any changes in the provision should be left to the Legislature. The
courts have continued to adhere to the section 351 tolling provision
with respect to individual defendants despite the defendant's amena-
bility to service.1 9
14. Id. at 636, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
15. Defendant maintained that he was a California resident, and that he owned prop-
erty within the state. During the times he was out of the state (visiting his mother), his busi-
ness and residential addresses were the same as they had been at the time of the accident.
Thus, he claimed, he was amenable to process. Id. at 634, 591 P.2d at 512, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
221.
16. In lieu of personal delivery, a summons and complaint may now be served by leav-
ing a copy at the office, dwelling house, usual place of abode or usual place of business of the
person to be served (§ 415.20); by mailing a copy to the party within or without the state
(§§ 415.30, 415.40); or by publication "in a named newspaper, published in this state, that is
most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served" (§ 415.50 subd. (b)). Id. (construing
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1987)). See infra note 23 for
relevant text.
17. Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 635, 591 P.2d at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (quoting Garcia v.
Flores, 64 Cal. App. 3d 705, 709, 134 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (1976)).
18. "When substituted service or constructive service ...is available in a cause of ac-
tion arising . . . out of operation of a motor vehicle ...[nlotwithstanding any provision of
section 351 ...to the contrary . . . the time of [defendant's] absence from this State is part of
the time limited for the commencement of the action." Dew, 23 Cal. 3d at 635, 591 P.2d at
512, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (construing CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 17460, 17463 (West 1959)). This
provision was extended to actions against nonresident motorists as well in Bigelow v. Smik, 6
Cal. App. 3d 10, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1970).
A second exception concerns the corporate defendant. Loope v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
114 Cal. App. 2d 611, 250 P.2d 651 (1952). See infra text accompanying notes 20-23.
19. See Maurer v. Individually and as Members of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept.,
691 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1982); Bledstein v. Superior Court Uezioriski), 162 Cal. App. 3d 152,
208 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1984); Garcia v. Flores, 64 Cal. App. 3d 705, 134 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1976).
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2. Applicability to Corporate Defendants
In light of the statutory provisions relative to service of sum-
mons on foreign corporations,"0 California courts have held section
351 inapplicable to corporate defendants. In Loope v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc.,21 the Fourth District Court held that a corporation was
never out of the state for tolling purposes because a corporation
could always be served through a designated or substituted agent. 2
The code provides that service upon a foreign corporation can be
made on a designated agent, and if no agent has been named, service
may be made on the Secretary of State.2" As a result, only non-ame-
nability to service causes the tolling provision to apply to a corporate
defendant." '
20. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987). See infra note
23 for relevant text.
21. 114 Cal. App. 2d 611, 250 P.2d 651 (1952).
22. In Loope, the one year statute of limitations was tolled to extend the time within
which a personal injury action could be brought against the defendant bus driver, but it was
not tolled with respect to the corporate defendant, Greyhound. It was not clear whether Grey-
hound was a domestic or foreign corporation but the court reasoned that if it was a foreign
corporation and doing business within the state it was subject to service. Id. at 614, 250 P.2d
at 652.
23. The applicable code sections provide:
2105(a)- A foreign corporation shall not transact intrastate business without
having first obtained from the Secretary of State a certificate of qualification. To
obtain that certificate it shall file, . . . a statement and designation . . . stating:
(4) The name of an agent upon whom process directed to the corporation
may be served within this state. (5) Its irrevocable consent to service of process
directed to it upon the agent designated and to service of process on the Secre-
tary of State if the agent so designated or the agent's successor is no longer
authorized to act or cannot be found at the address given.
2110- Delivery by hand of a copy of any process against a foreign corporation
(a) to any officer of the corporation or its general manager in this state, or if the
corporation is a bank to a cashier or an assistant cashier, (b) to any natural
person designated by it as agent for the service of process, or (c), if the corpora-
tion has designated a corporate agent, to any person named in the latest certifi-
cate of such corporate agent filed pursuant to Section 1505 shall constitute valid
service on the corporation...
2111 (a)- If the agent designated for the service of process is a natural person
and cannot be found with due diligence at the address stated in the designation
or if such agent is a corporation and no person can be found with due diligence
to whom the delivery authorized by section 2110 may be made for the purpose
of delivery to such corporate agent, or if the agent designated is no longer au-
thorized to act, or if no agent has been designated and if no one of the officers or
agents of the corporation specified in Section 2110 can be found after diligent
search and it is so shown by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court, then the
court may make an order that service be made by personal delivery to the Secre-
tary of State or to an assistant or deputy secretary of state. . ..
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105, 2110 (West 1977 & Supp. 1987), § 2111 (West 1977).
24. Nonamenability to service has been the rationale used in subsequent cases. See Ren-
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3. Past Use of Amenability to Service as a Defense
Before enactment of the Convention, several cases had allowed
foreign corporations to invoke amenability to service as a defense de-
spite the fact that they had not registered to do business within Cali-
fornia.25 In Raynolds v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft," an ac-
tion had been filed, 17 but the plaintiffs failed to prosecute such action
within two years. The foreign corporation moved for dismissal under
Civil Procedure Code section 583,28 which permits a judge to dismiss
an action for want of prosecution. The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant, Volkswagenwerk, was "absent" from California because
the defendant had failed to designate an agent for service of process
and failed to obtain a certificate of qualification to do business within
the state. The plaintiffs argued that since the corporation was absent
from California, they had a valid excuse for failure to timely prose-
cute their action.' The court used the Dew and Loope analysis80 and
held that a foreign corporation could not be "absent" since it was
subject to substituted service, and further, that the corporation's fail-
ure to comply with the statutory provisions8" did not preclude it
from defending the action. Citing Taylor v. Navigazione Libera Tri-
estina,82 the court noted "[I]f a foreign corporation fails to qualify
for the transaction of intrastate business under California statutory
froe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 541 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mo. 1982). "CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 351
• ..has been construed, as to corporate defendants, to mean that it is nonamenability to ser-
vice of process, including substituted service, that causes the tolling provision to apply." See
also Dedmon v. Falls Prods. Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1962), (identical analysis is
applied in the Fifth Circuit).
25. See Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956); Taylor
v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, 95 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1938); Raynolds v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 275 Cal. App. 2d 997, 80 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1969).
26. 275 Cal. App. 2d 997, 80 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1969).
27. In Raynolds, the action was filed October 31, 1963. Thus, the Hague Convention
on Service of Process would not apply here because the Convention did not become effective
until 1967. See infra text accompanying notes 36-39.
28. CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 583 (repealed in 1984 but replaced by section 583.410)
provided in relevant part: "The Court may in its discretion dismiss any action for want of
prosecution on motion of the defendant and after due notice to the plaintiff, whenever plaintiff
has failed for two years after action is filed to bring such action to trial. ... Raynolds, 275
Cal. App. 2d at 1000 n.5, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 612 n.5 (construing CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 583
(West 1929)).
29. Raynolds, 275 Cal. App. 2d at 1000-02, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
30. The Dew court held that section 351 applied to individual defendants. Loope held
that section 351 did not apply to corporate defendants because they were subject to substituted
service.
31. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1987). See supra note
23 for relevant text.
32. 95 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1938).
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law, such failure does not impose a forfeiture of the right to plead
the statute of limitations.""3 By analogy, the court reasoned that fail-
ure to comply with the statutory provisions did not preclude defend-
ant from availing itself of the benefits of section 583."'
Loope, Raynolds and Taylor present an assumption that substi-
tuted service is valid service upon foreign corporations. Since these
decisions, however, the Hague Convention on Service Abroad 5 was
changed to provide that, in cases where a signatory country objects to
substituted service, it is invalid.
B. Amenability of Service as Applied to Foreign Corporations
Which Do Not Accept Service By Mail
1. Rejection of Service by Mail Through the Convention
The Hague Convention on Service Abroad permits countries to
object to service of process by mail. When a country ratifies the Con-
vention and objects to service by mail, foreign corporations located in
that country indirectly objects to service by mail as well." The objec-
tives of this Convention were: a) to bring actual notice of the docu-
ment to be served to the recipient in sufficient time to enable prepa-
ration of a proper defense; b) to simplify the method of transmission
of these documents; and c) to facilitate proof that service had been
affected abroad by means of a uniform model." In order to achieve
these objectives, the Convention established a system whereby a
"Central Authority"3 " accepts documents. To comply with the Con-
vention, effective service is to be directed to the signatory country's
designated authority. The important provisions for purposes of this
comment are Article 10, which provides for service by postal chan-
nels, and Article 21, which permits a signatory to object to Article
10.11 Several states, most notably Germany, have objected to the use
33. Raynolds, 275 Cal. App. 2d at 1003-04, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
34. See Dedmon, 299 F.2d at 173, for a similar holding in another jurisdiction.
35. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
36. The complete name of the international treaty is THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS [hereinafter the
Convention]; The Netherlands Law Digest, Nov. 15, 1965, United States-Netherlands, 20
U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. 658 U.N.T.S. 163. The text may also be found in: Martin-
dale-Hubbell Law Directory, pt. VII, 1 (1985).
37. MAARTEN KLUWER'S INTERNATIONALE UITGEVERSONDERNEMING, HAGUE CON-
FERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW CONVENTION SERVICE OF PROCESS ABROAD
28 (1983).
38. A "Central authority" is merely one designated to accept service of process.
39. Article 10 states in relevant part: "Provided the State of destination does not object,
the present Convention shall not interfere with - (a) the freedom to send judicial documents,
1987]
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of the mail for transmission of judicial documents."0
2. Effect of the Convention on California Law
California cannot effectively serve a foreign defendant, such as a
German corporation, through its foreign corporation code provi-
sions"' because the United States is a party"2 to the Convention. The
Convention, as a treaty, is the supreme law of the land."3 If no agent
of the foreign corporation has been designated,4 service may not be
substituted upon the Secretary of State. California Corporations
Code section 2111(b)'5 requires the Secretary of State to send notice
of service to the corporation by registered mail. Because the crucial
aspect of service is notification, service upon the Secretary of State is
invalid when intended for the special foreign corporations which do
by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." Id. Article 21 states that: "Each contracting
State shall, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, or at a later
date, inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands of the following. . . .Each
contracting State shall similarly inform the Ministry, where appropriate, of opposition to the
use of methods of transmission pursuant to articles 8 and 10." HAGUE CONVENTION ON SER-
VICE OF PRoCESS ABROAD, Nov. 15, 1965, United States-Netherlands arts. 10, 21, 20 U.S.T.
361, 363, 365 T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (1969).
40. Germany is noted and used as an example because: 1) German products are preva-
lent in California, so German corporations are likely defendants; 2) there are many reported
German cases; and 3) for simplification. However, Botswana, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Egypt, Germany, Norway, and Turkey have all objected to service through postal channels.
See MAARTEN KLUWER'S INTERNATIONALE UITGEVERSONDERNEMING, HAGUE CONVEN-
TION-SERVICE OF PROCESS ABROAD, supra note 37 at 92-131; The Netherlands Law Di-
gest, supra note 36.
41. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1987). See supra note
23 for relevant text. See generally Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123
'Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Pierburg GMBH & Co. KG v. Superior Court,
137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982) (cases holding the Hague Convention rules
for discovery proceedings must be followed). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.10 (West
Supp. 1987) (statute recognizing the Convention's service of process provisions are supreme).
42. The United States ratified the Convention, supra note 36, on August 24, 1967 and
the provisions came into force on February 10, 1969. MAARTEN KLUWER'S INTERNATIONALE
UITGEVERSONDERNEMING, HAGUE CONVENTION-SERVICE OF PROCESS ABROAD, supra
note 37, at 22.
43. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
44. This often occurs when a foreign manufacturer "shields" itself through a distributor
or subsidiary. The foreign manufacturer is not doing business within California and is not
required to register or appoint an agent. See Coons v. Honda Motor Co. of Japan, 176 N.J.
575, 424 A.2d 446 (1980).
45. California Corporations Code section 2111(b) provides in part:
Upon receipt of the process and order and the fee therefor [sic] the Secretary of
State forthwith shall give notice to the corporation of the service of the process
by forwarding by registered mail, with request for return receipt, a copy of the
process and order to the address specified in the order. . ..
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2111(b) (West 1977).
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not accept service by mail.
This issue was discussed in Porsche A.G. v. Superior Court."
In Porsche, the plaintiff attempted to serve the German defendant
directly through registered mail addressed to the German defendant
and indirectly through the Secretary of State. The court found that,
despite plaintiff's numerous and diligent attempts to serve the Ger-
man defendant, plaintiffs had not complied with the Convention.
The Porsche court held that California courts are bound by the Con-
vention and may not exercise jurisdiction in violation of the
Convention: 4
7
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."'
The Convention required service of process on the "Central Author-
ity" and required that it be translated into German.4 The court
stated that, even if the German defendant had actual notice, this
would be insufficient to avoid the effect of noncompliance with the
Convention. Service of process through the Secretary of State was
therefore invalid.
In order to comply with the Convention, it follows that foreign
corporations in a country which, under the Convention does not .per-
mit service by mail, cannot be served through any of the statutory
46. 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981).
47. See also Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(a Missouri district court held that Convention service was not proper and thus excused de-
fendant); Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973);
48. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (also quoted in Porsche, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 760, 177
Cal. Rptr. at 158).
49. For the German "Central Authority" address list, see German Law Digest, 7 MAR-
TINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. VII, 4 (1985). See supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
50. The plaintiffs in Porsche argued that they had been misled into not serving defend-
ant's designated agent in the United States under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1399(e)). The court held, however, that "the scope of such agency is
limited to actions which pertain to that act and not to common law actions commenced in
California courts." 123 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
In so holding the court rejected the contrary analysis of Bollard v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
313 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Mo. 1970). The Bollard court held that a tort action may be served
upon the agent designated to receive service of process pursuant to the National Traffic Motor
Vehicle Safety Act. Similarly, in Richardson, a Missouri district court held that the National
Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety Act cannot be construed to allow service by mail.
1987]
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provisions. 1 It should follow, then, that these defendants are absent
from the state for the purposes of the section 351 tolling provision.' 2
Because they are not easily amenable to service,'" these foreign cor-
porations should be treated like individuals out of the state.' 4 These
special corporations should not be treated like other foreign corpora-
tions because they cannot be served through the normal procedures."'
In other states, courts have recognized that the statute of limitations
tolls when the foreign corporate defendant is not amenable to service.
3. Tolling the Statute Against Foreign Corporations - The
Approach of Other States.
In Coons v. American Honda Motor Co. of Japan,' the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations was prop-
erly tolled against a foreign manufacturer when the foreign corpora-
tion had neither any place of business in the state nor had any agents
for service of process located within the state. In Coons, the plaintiffs
filed suit against American Honda and Honda Motor Co. of Japan.
The defendant, American Honda, was dismissed due to the statute of
limitations but the suit against the Japanese defendant survived due
to the New Jersey tolling provision.'
7
Like the Japanese defendant in Coons, a foreign corporation
which does not accept service by mail and has no agents within the
state is forever subject to suit. Because this class of defendants cannot
* 51. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1975). See supra note 23 for relevant
text.
52. To date there is no California case on point, perhaps because plaintiffs do not real-
ize they continue to have a cause of action against these defendants.
53. For example, to effectively serve a German defendant, the service of process must be
translated into German and delivered to the "Central Authority." German Law Digest, 7
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt VII, 4 (1985). To note the problems a Califor-
nia plaintiff encounters while attempting to serve a German defendant, see Porsche, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 755, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981).
54. See e.g., Dew, 23 Cal. 3d 630, 591 P.2d 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1979).
55. See generally Loope, 114 Cal. App. 2d 611, 250 P.2d 651 (1952).
56. 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446 (1980), vacated by sub nom., Honda Motor Co.
v. Coons, 455 U.S. 996 (1982), remanded sub nom., Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94
N.J. 307, 463 A.2d 921 (1983), rehearing, 96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763 (1984), cert. denied,
sub nora., Honda Motor Co. v. Coons, 469 U.S. 1123 (1985).
57. Denied the statute of limitations defense, Honda of Japan argued that they were
being denied equal protection of the laws. The court held that the distinction in the tolling
provision was not irrational and thus equal protection was not violated. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the equal protection decision but remanded the case in light of Searle &
Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1981), because there might have been a commerce clause violation.
Honda Motor Co. of Japan was eventually dismissed because the tolling statute violated the
commerce clause. 455 U.S. at 996. For discussion of the commerce clause, see infra text ac-
companying notes 66-71.
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be served through the Secretary of State, the section 351 tolling pro-
vision applies during the entire period they are out of the state.
Therefore, a California plaintiff has no time limitation in which to
bring his suit. Although as the law stands, there are significant ad-
vantages for a California plaintiff, both the plaintiff and foreign cor-
poration would benefit by a change which would allow the defendant
to be served in California.
III. HOLDING A FOREIGN CORPORATION INDEFINITELY
SUBJECT TO SUIT - A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY Coons v. Honda Motor Co. of Japan
The United States Supreme Court has commented on the con-
stitutionality of state tolling provisions which operate to hold foreign
defendants subject to suit indefinitely."' In Coons v. Honda Motor
Co. of Japan,59 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the statute
of limitations properly tolled indefinitely in a products liability ac-
tion brought against a foreign manufacturer. The distributor, Ameri-
can Honda Motor Co., was granted summary judgment because the
statute of limitations barred plaintiff's suit. The designer-manufac-
turer, Honda Motor Co. of Japan, argued that it should be treated
likewise. The Japanese defendants argued that, like the treatment of
foreign corporations which had representatives within the state to
accept service of process, the Legislature intended that corporations
amenable to long-arm service60 were to be exempt from the tolling
provision." The New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on Velmohos
58. See Honda Motor Co. v. Coons, 455 U.S. 996 (1982); Searle, 455 U.S. 404 (1982).
59. 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446 (1980).
60. Honda Motor Company was subject to long-arm service through its agent, a Wash-
ington, D.C. law firm. "Long-arm service" refers to a state legislative act which provides for
personal jurisdiction, via substituted service of process, over nonresident persons or corpora-
tions which voluntarily enter a state for a limited purpose.
61. The applicable New Jersey tolling provisions are N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-22
(West 1987). They provide in relevant part:
[If any corporation or corporate surety not organized under the laws of this
State against whom there is such a cause of action, is not represented in this
State by any person or officer upon whom summons or other original process
may be served, when such cause of action accrues or at any time before expira-
tion of the times so limited, the time . . . during which . . . such corporation or
corporate surety is not so represented within this State shall not be computed as
part of the periods of time within which such an action is required to be
commenced. ...
Id.
A 1949 amendment excluded represented foreign corporations from the tolling effect. See
Velmohos v. Maren Eng'g Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980).
1987]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
v. Maren Engineering Corp. 2 and Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc.,6"
narrowly defined the statute's requirement that a foreign corporation
be represented within the state. The definition did not include corpo-
rations amenable to long-arm service. 64 Because the defendants had
neither a place of business nor agents to accept service of process
within New Jersey, the tolling provision applied and Honda Motor
Co. of Japan was forever subject to suit.6
A. Commerce Clause Violations
The decision in Coons was appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, and the Court remanded the case"' for resolution of
commerce clause issues in light of G.D. Searle & Company v.
Cohn. 7 Searle was a similar case in that the defendants were not
represented in New Jersey and thus did not qualify for the exception
to the tolling provision. The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment based on the statute of limitations.68 The court held, however,
that the tolling provision continued in force despite the advent of
long-arm jurisdiction, and thus, the tolling provision applied to de-
fendant Searle."' On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
62. 83 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980). In Velmohos, the plaintiff sought damages re-
sulting from a defective machine supplied by an out of state corporation not registered to do
business in the state. The court held that the statute which tolled against unrepresented foreign
corporations, are amenable to long-arm service, was constitutional.
63. 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980). Hopkins was an action against a non-resident manu-
facturer of oral contraceptives to recover for damages caused by a birth and/or the contracep-
tive pill. The court held that a statute tolling against foreign corporations not represented in
the state, but amenable to long-arm jurisdiction, was constitutional.
64. Concerning the applicability of the tolling provision, the court distinguished New
Jersey's statute, which expressly required representation within the state from other jurisdic-
tions whose tolling provisions merely required absence from the state (e.g. California, Ala-
bama, Ohio, and Texas). In the former, representation was to be more narrowly construed.
Thus, corporations which were subject to long-arm service but which were not represented
within New Jersey were not to be excluded from the tolling provision. Velmohos, 83 N.J. at
287, 416 A.2d at 378.
65. For a critique on the New Jersey tolling provision, see Comment, supra note 2.
66. Honda Motor Co. v. Coons, 455 U.S. 996 (1982). See supra note 56.
67. 455 U.S. 404 (1982). The confusing case history is as follows: Cohn v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1978), rev'd sub nom, Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628
F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom, G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 451 U.S. 905
(1981), vacated and remanded, G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982), remanded,
Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 677 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1982), remanded, to district court.
68. G.D. Searle & Company was a Delaware corporation not authorized to do business
in New Jersey. Its principal place of business was Illinois.
69. Searle, 447 F. Supp. at 912. The court based its decision on Velmohos, 83 N.J. 282,
416 A.2d 372 (1980), a New Jersey Supreme Court case which held that the tolling provision
continued in force despite long-arm jurisdiction.
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petitioner Searle contended that, in order to benefit from the statute
of limitations, it would have had to obtain a certificate of authority
by registering to do business in New Jersey. The corporation would
have to subject itself to all the duties and liabilities imposed on a
domestic corporation. This, Searle argued, was a violation of the
commerce clause."' The Supreme Court remanded the case,
expressing concern that the commerce clause dispute was clouded
with ambiguity.7 1
Based on the foregoing commerce clause issues noted in Searle,
the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded Honda."
On remand, the appellate court held that a statute requiring an un-
represented foreign corporation to register in New Jersey in order to
benefit from the statute of limitations violates the commerce clause.
The court noted that state regulations affecting interstate commerce
will be upheld if: (1) the regulation is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state end; and (2) the regulatory burden imposed on interstate
commerce, and any discrimination against it, are outweighed by the
state interest in enforcing the regulation.7" However, some statutes
are invalid without any balancing if they require licensing require-
ments imposed on foreign corporations involved in interstate com-
merce.7 4 The court held that there is no fundamental right to a stat-
ute of limitations defense, but rather statutes of limitations are a
matter of legislative grace. However, this legislative control cannot
exceed constitutional limits:
The legislature cannot accomplish indirectly that which it could
not do directly: it cannot, in effect, force licensure on foreign
70. Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the states. See infra note 97.
Searle also argued that forcing a company to register to do business within the state was a
violation of equal protection. The commerce clause challenge was upheld, the Equal Protection
challenge was dismissed.
71. The ambiguity centered on dicta in Velmohos, which stated: "We note that whatever
hardship on foreign corporations might be caused by continued exposure to suit can be easily
eliminated by the designation of an agent for service of process within the state." 83 N.J. at
293 n.10, 416 A.2d at 378 n.10 (also quoted in Searle, 455 U.S. at 414). Similarly, in Hop-
kins v. Kelsey-Hayes, 677 F.2d 301 (3rd Cir. 1982), the Third Circuit remanded the case to
the district court for determination of the same commerce clause question.
72. Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307, 463 A.2d 921 (1983) (the case
had been previously remanded by the United States Supreme Court in Honda Motor Co. v.
Coons, 455 U.S. 996 (1982) for consideration in light of Searle)).
73. Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. at 311, 463 A.2d at 926. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5, at 326 (1978).
74. For decisions which hold that a state cannot discriminate against a foreign corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce merely because it has failed to qualify to do business in
that state, see Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); and Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
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corporations dealing exclusively in interstate commerce by oth-
erwise preventing them from gaining the benefit of the statute of
limitations defense. The burden thus imposed on interstate com-
merce is unconstitutional.7
Because the tolling provision was regarded as a forced-licensure
provision,76 it was struck down as a violation of the commerce
clause." Honda Motor Co. of Japan was permitted to assert the
statute of limitations defense.
7 8
B. Violation of Equal Protection
A second issue raised by these opinions is an equal protection
challenge.79 In the first Honda case, Coons v. Honda Motor Co.
Ltd., of Japan,80 the defendants argued that the tolling provision
was a violation of the Constitution's equal protection clause. They
argued that there was no basis for the different treatment of repre-
sented corporations and unrepresented corporations which were
amenable to long-arm service."a However, the equal protection chal-
lenge was dismissed in all the cases. As the United States Supreme
Court noted in Searle, "in the absence of a classification that is in-
herently invidious or that impinges upon fundamental rights, a state
statute is to be upheld against equal protection attack if it is ration-
ally related to the achievement of legitimate governmental ends."8
The flaw in the defendant's argument was that it refused to
acknowledge that among amenable foreign corporations there are de-
75. Coons v. American Honda, 94 N.J. at 311, 463 A.2d at 927.
76. The dissenting opinion followed an opposite approach with respect to the dicta in
Velmohos. The dissenters felt that in order to benefit from the statute of limitations defense, all
that was required under New Jersey law was appointment of an agent for service of process.
Submission to jurisdiction by obtaining a certificate to do business was not required. Coons v.
American Honda, 94 N.J. at 311, 463 A.2d at 927.
77. Coons v. American Honda, 94 N.J. at 318, 463 A.2d at 927. See also McKinley v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 942 (D. Idaho 1983) (The Idaho tolling statute places
the foreign corporation in the same difficult position of having to choose between exposing
itself to personal jurisdiction in Idaho, or remaining liable in perpetuity for claims filed against
it in Idaho. After balancing the burdens and benefits, the court found the Idaho tolling provi-
sion to be unconstitutional as a violation of the commerce clause.).
78. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the decision in Coons v. American Honda
Motor Co., 96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763 (1984).
79. The equal protection argument is derived from the U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
which states: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." Id.
80. 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446 (1980).
81. Similar arguments were made in Searle, 455 U.S. at 409; Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes
Inc., 628 F.2d at 809-10; and Velmohos, 83 N.J. at 285, 416 A.2d at 374.
82. 455 U.S. at 408 (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)).
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grees of difficulty in effecting service. These degrees are the rational
basis for distinguishing between represented corporations and those
unrepresented but amenable to long-arm service.8" Quoting Hopkins
v. Kelsey-Hayes,8 4 the Supreme Court noted:
Since service of process under the long-arm statute is more diffi-
cult and time-consuming to achieve than service within the
state, and since out-of-state, non-represented corporate defend-
ants may be difficult to locate let alone serve, tolling the statute
of limitations protects New Jersey plaintiffs and facilitates their
lawsuits against such defendants.8 5
California, unlike New Jersey, has followed the majority ap-
proach and held that, for corporate defendants, only nonamenability
to service causes the tolling provision to apply.8 Furthermore, in
California, amenability to service is not dependent upon registration
to do business within the state.87 Thus, the Honda problem would
not occur in California. Because Honda was subject to long-arm ju-
risdiction and could be served through the Secretary of State, it was
amenable to service. However, in California, Honda would not have
needed to register to do business in order to take advantage of the
statute of limitations defense.
C. The California Problem
Although the Honda holding per se would not be a problem in
California because foreign corporations need not register to do busi-
ness to take advantage of the statute of limitations, the problem re-
mains that defendants will be indefinitely subject to suit. In Califor-
nia, the problem arises when the defendant is a corporation in a
country which does not permit service by mail. 8 In these cases, ser-
vice upon the Secretary of State8' is not effective notice to the out-of-
83. Velmohos, 83 N.J. at 295, 416 A.2d at 381.
84. Searle, 455 U.S. at 408 (quoting Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes Inc., 628 F.2d 801, 811
(3d Cir. 1980)).
85. Id. at 408.
86. Loope, 114 Cal. App. 2d 611, 250 P.2d 651 (1952).
87. See Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956); Taylor
v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, 95 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1938); Raynolds, 275 Cal. App. 2d
997, 80 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1969).
88. Countries are able to object to service by mail through an international treaty, the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents. See supra
text accompanying notes 36-39.
89. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2105, 2110, 2111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1987). See supra note
23 for relevant text.
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state defendant and thus is invalid. Porsche90 is a good example of
the problem. In Porsche, the plaintiffs diligently attempted to serve
the German defendants by registered mail both directly and indi-
rectly through the Secretary of State. The court correctly held that
neither method was in compliance with the Convention, thus render-
ing the service invalid.9 ' However, the court did not complete the
analysis. There was no mention of the section 351 tolling provi-
sion.92 The court expressly held that service upon the Secretary of
State was not valid under the Convention and that a California court
could not exercise jurisdiction in violation of the Convention.9" These
observations naturally lead to the conclusion that the section 351
tolling provision applies. Loope" held that a foreign corporation can
always be served through a designated or substituted agent, namely,
the Secretary of State. Thus, the corporate defendants in countries
which do not permit service by mail and do not have a designated
agent within California are out of the state for tolling purposes95 and
are subject to suit indefinitely.
From a planning perspective, indefinite liability creates
problems for the foreign corporation and the California plaintiff en-
counters difficulties when attempting to serve these defendants.
Thus, both the foreign corporation and the California plaintiff
would benefit from a statutory amendment which provides for an
agent to accept service of process.
IV. VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENT OF AN AGENT
In addition to reconfirming the fact that German defendants
cannot be served through the Secretary of State, Porsche illustrates
the difficulties encountered in trying to effectively serve defendants in
countries which do not permit service by mail. It would appear that
the voluntary rejection of service by mail by foreign corporations
does not warrant special protection. However, the difficulties en-
countered when serving these defendants indicates that a change
would be advantageous for both plaintiff and defendant.
90. 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981).
91. Id. at 762, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
92. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 351 (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 8 for
relevant text.
93. Porsche, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 159. Furthermore, the court
concluded that even if Porsche had actual notice, this would be insufficient to avoid the effect
of noncompliance with the Convention.
94. 114 Cal. App. 2d 611, 250 P.2d 651 (1952).
95. Porsche, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
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The simplest solution to counter both the problems of indefinite
exposure to suit and the difficulty in service is voluntary appoint-
ment of an agent to accept service of process in California. The Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure should be amended with respect to
these special defendants as follows:
351(a) - Tolling Provision as applied to foreign corporate de-
fendants in countries which do not permit service by mail-
A foreign corporate defendant, otherwise constitutionally ame-
nable to jurisdiction in this state, located in a country which
does not accept service by mail shall be deemed out of the state
for tolling purposes unless it has filed with the Secretary of
State a statement designating an agent to accept service of pro-
cess within the state. If (a) no such agent has been named, (b)
no such agent can be found, or (c) such agent is no longer au-
thorized to act, personal delivery of service upon the Secretary
of State is invalid. In these latter cases, service can only be effec-
tive if carried out in compliance with the Hague Convention on
Service of Process Abroad and the foreign corporate defendant is
deemed out of the state for tolling purposes. For purposes of
this section, such agent shall not constitute means for personal
jurisdiction by this state over any foreign corporation.
For purposes of the tolling provision, service would be complete
when the agent is servedY. Legislation providing for voluntary ap-
pointment of an agent in these special cases, where the defendant is a
corporation located in a country which does not permit service by
mail, would withstand the constitutional challenges.
A. Commerce Clause Challenge
The proposal must first withstand challenge under the com-
merce clause. 97 The commerce clause was intended to insure that
everyone has free access to every market in the nation and that there
is no exclusion by state customs, duties, or regulations.9" As noted
Constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe points out, "[in most
cases] [s]tate regulation affecting interstate commerce will be upheld
if, (a) the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state end,
96. Service upon the appointed agent is completed when served. This is similar to the
treatment of service upon subsidiaries of foreign corporations. See, e.g., Ex Parte Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1983); Taca Int'l Airlines v. Rolls-Royce of
England, 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Ct. App. 1965).
97. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 grants Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the several states. The provision was intended to foster development and maintenance
of a national common market and to eradicate trade barriers.
98. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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and (b) the regulatory burden imposed on interstate commerce, and
any discrimination against it, are outweighed by the state interest in
enforcing the regulation." 9' When balancing the interests, courts
look at the burden imposed on foreign corporations when they com-
ply with the state statute at issue. *00 If the regulation is a licensing1"'
requirement and is applied only to corporations engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce, the regulation is a per se violation and no
balancing is needed.102 California, however, does not require that a
foreign corporation be licensed within the state in order for it to take
advantage of the statute of limitations defense.103 The proposed stat-
ute is not a licensing scheme but, rather, a provision for voluntary
appointment of an agent to accept service of process. Thus, to deter-
mine whether the proposal violates the commerce clause, a balancing
test which focuses on the burden imposed by the proposed statute is
used.
A similar analysis was employed by the Idaho District Court in
McKinley v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.104 In McKinley, foreign
corporations which failed to designate a person within the state for
service of process were denied protection under the statute of limita-
tions.10 The McKinley court found that the purpose of the statute
was to toll the statute of limitations during the time that defendants
were not otherwise subject to jurisdiction. Consequently, the statute
burdened interstate commerce by forcing a foreign corporation, in
effect, to waive any minimum contacts objection to jurisdiction, ex-
99. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5, at 326 (1978) (also quoted in
Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307, 316-17, 463 A.2d 921, 926 (1983)).
100. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-
On-Drugs, 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
101. Licensing in this context refers to permission to do business in the state.
102. Allenberg, 419 U.S. 20; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co., 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Mc-
Kinley v. Combustion Eng'g, 575 F. Supp. 942 (D. Idaho 1983); Coons v. America Honda
Motor Co., 94 N.J. 307, 463 A.2d 921 (1983).
103. Taylor v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, 95 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1938); Raynolds,
275 Cal. App. 2d 997, 80 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1969).
104. 575 F. Supp. 942 (D. Idaho 1983).
105. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-502, 30-509 (1939), provides in relevant part:
30-509 -Statute of Limitations- Every such corporation which fails to comply
with the provisions of this chapter shall be denied the benefit of the statutes of
the state limiting the time for the commencement of civil actions, and any limi-
tations in such statutes shall only run in favor of any such corporations during
such time as such person duly designated, as aforesaid, upon whom such service
can be made, shall be within the state.
Id. Code section 30-502 required a foreign corporation to designate a person within the state
for service of process. Both codes were repealed subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit.
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posing itself to personal jurisdiction in Idaho.' Furthermore, the
court concluded that the benefits of the challenged statute were insig-
nificant. It noted that appointment of in-state representatives made it
easier for Idaho residents to effect service on such corporations be-
cause a plaintiff did not have to locate and serve a distant defendant.
The court found the real benefit, however, to be a mere cost and
time savings, stating that "with the multitude of process-serving
firms in every state, the chances of being completely unable to locate
a foreign company doing business in Idaho are very small."1 '
Both of the McKinley conclusions concerning the burden and
the benefit of the Idaho statue are significantly altered when applied
to California's treatment of defendants in countries which do not
permit service by mail. In order for a foreign corporate defendant -to
come within California jurisdiction, the defendant must have the
requisite minimum contacts in California."0 8 Appointing an agent to
accept service under the proposed statute does not waive the lack of
minimum contacts defense.' 09 Only foreign corporations which have
the required minimum contacts can be held liable in California, and
only those corporations which anticipate being subject to California
jurisdiction would be interested in voluntarily appointing an agent to
accept service of process.
The proposed statute does not expose any corporate defendant
to personal jurisdiction which is not already subject to jurisdiction."0
Thus, the burden of personal jurisdiction noted in McKinley is less-
ened, if not entirely lifted. Likewise, the minimal benefit of cost and
time savings noted in McKinley is much more significant when ap-
plied to the special class of foreign defendants. Locating and serving
a German defendant can be extremely difficult,"' in addition to be-
106. McKinley, 575 F. Supp. at 946.
107. Id. at 947.
108. Minimum contacts is a doctrine which requires that there be sufficient (minimum)
contacts within the state before an out of state defendant may be sued in that state. See Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Seacrest Mach. Corp. v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. 3d 664, 660 P.2d 399, 190 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1983); Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
109. See supra text accompanying note 96. The proposed statute expressly maintains
any minimum contacts defense.
110. Admittedly, the rules regarding jurisdiction through minimum contacts are not
hard and fast guidelines. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. See generally Lilly,
Jurisdiction Over Domestic & Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85 (1983). Nevertheless, a
foreign corporation which has reason to question the contacts in California would not waive
the minimum contacts defense by appointing an agent to accept service of process within
California.
111. See Porsche, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981). (difficulties encoun-
tered in attempting to serve a German defendant).
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ing time consuming and expensive. 1 2 The benefits derived from be-
ing able to serve an agent in California are substantial and clearly
outweigh any burdens imposed.
B. The Preemption Challenge
The proposed statute will also withstand a preemption chal-
lenge." It may be argued that federal law, through The Hague
Convention on Service of Process Abroad, 1 " preempts the effect of
the proposal. The United States Supreme Court in De Canas v.
Bical" discussed the tests employed to determine whether a state
statute is preempted by the United States Constitution. The first test
is whether Congress has clearly and manifestly evidenced an intent
to occupy the field, or alternatively, whether the state statute is an
obstacle to the congressional purpose." 6 The conclusion that the pro-
posed statute regulates in a field that Congress alone occupies should
be reached only if "the nature of the regulated subject matter per-
mits no other conclusion or [if] Congress has unmistakably so or-
dained." ' 7 This is not the case with the proposed statute. Statutes of
limitations are within state power. They are a matter of state proce-
dure and left to each individual state. The Hague Convention 1 8 does
not deal with statutes of limitations but only service of process.
Additionally, the second prong, whether the proposed statute is
an obstacle to congressional intent, also does not conflict with the
proposal. Federal law may preempt a state law when the state law
"stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
that Congress sought to achieve." ' In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indo-
112. The Hague Convention requires that service on German defendants is made upon
the applicable Central Authority and that it is translated into German. See supra notes 36-39
and accompanying text.
113. The idea that a federal law may preempt or take precedence over a state law is
derived from the supremacy clause. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 36.
115. 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (The United States Supreme Court in De Canas reviewed a
California statute that inflicted criminal and civil penalties upon employees who knowingly
employed illegal aliens. Although the power to regulate immigration is vested in the federal
government, the California statute was not preempted by constitutional power). See also El-
sworth v. Beech Aircraft Co., 37 Cal. 3d 540, 691 P.2d 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1984).
116. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 353-63. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Doe v. Plyler, 628
F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980)
117. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356 (quoting Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, 373
U.S. at 142), noted in Doe, 628 F.2d at 452.
118. See supra text accompanying note 37.
119. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. See also Elsworth, 37 Cal. 3d at 548, 691 P.2d at 634, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 878.
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nesia on April 22, 1974,120 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was
called upon to decide if a California statute had been preempted by
the Warsaw Convention. 1' The court held that the statute in ques-
tion was a violation of the congressional scheme embodied in the
Convention because it prevented the application of a Convention
provision. Consequently, the California statute was preempted. 122
The proposed statute is not preempted by the purposes and
objectives underlying the Hague Convention. The major purposes of
the Hague Convention were to bring actual notice to the recipient in
sufficient time to enable him to defend himself and to facilitate proof
that service has been affected abroad.'2 The scope of the Convention
does not extend to the statute of limitations. It merely establishes
methods for service of process. A statute of limitations determines the
amount of time a plaintiff has to serve process, not the manner of the
service. The Convention does concern actual notice. A state's limita-
tion of the period for filing suit, however, does not interfere with the
scope of the Convention. Nor does tolling the limitation period while
the defendant is out of the state interfere with the scope of the Con-
vention. Rather than conflicting with the Convention's underlying
policy of bringing actual notice to the defendant, the proposed stat-
ute, in fact, enhances the Convention's objectives. Providing for ap-
pointment of an agent to accept service of process within California
simplifies the notice procedure and does not require objecting coun-
tries to permit service by mail. California's treatment of foreign de-
fendants in countries which do not accept service by mail will with-
stand any constitutional scrutiny.
C. Benefits of the Proposal to the Foreign Corporation
The proposed statute not only withstands constitutional scrutiny
and assists California plaintiffs in effectuating service, but the statute
also benefits foreign defendants. Corporations in countries which do
not permit service by mail remain subject to suit indefinitely, which
is not advantageous. The corporation's prospectus remains inaccurate
120. 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (The California law which precluded a per-
son from contractually compromising his survivors' right to wrongful death recovery was pre-
empted by the Warsaw Convention to the extent that California law would prevent the appli-
cation of the Convention's limitation on liability).
121. See P.T. Airfast Services. v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 162, 188 Cal. Rptr.
628 (1983); Bradfield v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 681, 152 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1979), for additional examples of the Warsaw Convention preempting California law.
122. In Re Aircrash in Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308.
123. See generally MAARTEN KLUWER'S INTERNATIONALE UITGEVERSONDERNEMING,
supra note 37.
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because of the possibility of litigation claims. Corporate investments
and company insurance rates may continue to fluctuate unpredict-
ably. A corporate planning perspective requires relief from indefinite
liability. Indefinite liability may also create evidence problems when
witnesses die, memories fade, and/or evidence is lost. Judicial econ-
omy is best served when claims are filed promptly. The appointment
of an agent to accept service of process within California will also
enhance the foreign defendant's business reputation. By complying
with the statute, the foreign corporation essentially represents that it
does not intend to dodge responsibility and is willing to defend
claims against it. This showing of good faith by the foreign corpora-
tion will possibly be rewarded through increased product sales in
California.
V. CONCLUSION
California Civil Procedure Code section 351 tolls the statute of
limitations during the period an individual defendant is out of the
state. However, if the defendant is a corporation, the statute of limi-
tations is not tolled during the same period. Individual and corporate
defendants are treated differently because corporations may be served
through alternative means, either directly through the mail or indi-
rectly through the Secretary of State. However, some foreign corpo-
rate defendants, through their country's ratification of an interna-
tional treaty, the Hague Convention on Service Abroad, have
objected to service by mail. This special class of defendants may not
be served pursuant to California law. Consequently, these defen-
dants are not out of the state for tolling purposes and are subject to
liability indefinitely.
This situation is particularly advantageous for the California
plaintiff because suit may be filed at any time. Yet, the difficulty of
service makes it simultaneously disadvantageous. Indefinite liability
is also disadvantageous to the foreign corporate defendant due to dif-
ficulty of accurate business planning and adequate defense prepara-
tion. Both the California plaintiff and the foreign corporate defend-
ant would benefit from a modification of Civil Procedure Code
section 351. The California tolling statute should be amended to pro-
vide for voluntary appointment of an agent to accept service of pro-
cess within California.
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